By Stephen Johnson
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Since they were announced last August, peace talks between the FARC rebels and the government have put Colombia back in the headlines. Because of the large philosophical differences between the two sides, the talks are complex and could build up public expectations for a peace that cannot be achieved—at least not through negotiations. But there is something else running in the background, something banal and bureaucratic that offers much more promise. To be sure, a guerrilla demobilization would help this project immensely, but would not be an overwhelming obstacle if it did not occur. That project is a national development plan that contemplates improving land titling processes, building infrastructure, strengthening governance, and better integrating marginal rural communities and diverse population groups.
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Since they were announced last August, peace talks between the FARC rebels and the government have put Colombia back in the headlines. Because of the large philosophical differences between the two sides, the talks are complex and could build up public expectations for a peace that cannot be achieved—at least not through negotiations. But there is something else running in the background, something banal and bureaucratic that offers much more promise. To be sure, a guerrilla demobilization would help this project immensely, but would not be an overwhelming obstacle if it did not occur. That project is a national development plan that contemplates improving land titling processes, building infrastructure, strengthening governance, and better integrating marginal rural communities and diverse population groups. National development plans are not novel. Many countries have them. And although detailed blueprints can be misguided and confining compared to good policies, they are helpful in identifying goals or end-states. In 2010, the government of President Juan Manuel Santos introduced a plan called Prosperity for All. As a diagnostic, it identifies needs in security, law enforcement, infrastructure, education, social benefits, and business regulation. While it does not establish priorities or outline specific projects, it provides enough data for the government, private sector, and civil society to begin solving some of the problems that allowed insurgencies to develop in Colombia’s countryside in the first place.
Most of Colombia’s population lives along the central Andean ridge. To the west is the Pacific coast and rich farmland, known for coffee-growing. To the east is savannah suitable for ranching, oil exploration, and light industry. Only the riverine jungles of the southeast are inhospitable for settlement, but they offer a pristine environment for wildlife and conservation. These areas, including parts of the Andean ridge, have been playgrounds of guerrillas, drug traffickers, bandits, and paramilitary vigilantes for the last 50 years. In all, they comprise about two-thirds of Colombia’s countryside. Strengthening governments where they have been absent, establishing a framework for responsible resource use, and developing infrastructure to benefit people and industry will help alleviate poverty, lower unemployment, and take Colombia beyond middle-income ranks.
An end to the rural conflict will certainly produce a more propitious climate for all this to happen. However, it would be unwise for development to wait. Just as Colombia’s security forces are continuing to capture, demobilize, or kill FARC combatants. Their membership now reportedly numbers only about 8,000, and under pressure could dwindle to the point of irrelevance. The government could hasten that outcome by changing the rural landscape—by resolving land tenure issues, strengthening local governance, and providing transportation infrastructure to permit growth outside of the country’s urban corridor.
As in past attempts to negotiate with the FARC, it is in the rebels’ interest to string out talks to the maximum extent possible, as their strategy has always been to wait for the right moment to take over. That won’t happen if they demobilize now and opt to compete at the ballot box. Another rebel movement, the M-19 did that and disappeared as a political force. Odds are worse for the FARC. During the past decade, the guerrillas have had the lowest favorability rating of any institution in public opinion polls. Because of their criminal past, their top leaders are ineligible for public office. And they will have to make reparations to families of persons they killed, combatants they recruited as children, and civilians they injured with landmines and other explosive devices.
By keeping the talks going, they might hope for concessions on land use that will favor illicit moneymaking activities from continued drug trafficking to illegal mining. No doubt, some FARC leaders would like to integrate some of their combatants into rural security forces as well. While that may have worked in small, urban El Salvador, it would be risky in the vast Colombian countryside, where the span of accountability would be stretched.
Up to now, President Juan Manuel Santos has wisely said that the peace talks can’t go on forever, and specified next November as a deadline for concluding them. With the FARC still in army and police crosshairs, a negotiated end to Colombia’s internal conflict could happen, but is a remote possibility. In the meantime, Colombia’s development process needs to get rolling. Building up institutions and integrating rural populations into mainstream society looks ahead as much as ending the insurgency looks back. One course is more necessary than the other, and at the end of the day, halting the conflict can be accomplished whether the FARC cooperates or not.
Stephen Johnson is a senior fellow and director of the CSIS Americas Program.
Photo: Jesús Santrich, Narciso Isa Conde, and Iván Márquez
Credit: Globovisión, FLICKR, Creative Commons