By Stephen Johnson
A measure called the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 made its way through both chambers of Congress this fall and was signed into law by President Obama on December 28. Since then, pundits have wondered whether the President capitulated to Congressional hawks alarmed at Iranian activities in the Americas, or if he thinks the measure will help pressure Iranian leaders to agree to nuclear transparency.Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast claimed it as evidence that the United States “still lives in the Cold War era and considers Latin America as its back yard.”
None of these views is on the mark, however. The bill, which has no money attached, gives the U.S. State Department 180 days to study Iran’s activities in the western hemisphere and develop a strategy to safeguard U.S. interests. Fortunately, a lot of that work has been done over the years from intelligence reporting to Library of Congress studies. But it needs to be reviewed and organized. And then there is the strategic piece that has been missing.
The bill, though long in coming, is justified. During the 1990s, Iran’s proxy Hezbollah was active in the Americas, from Canada and the United States to the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. Hezbollah claimed credit for the attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and was implicated in the bombing of the Jewish community center there in 1994, along with several Iranian officials. Even though Hezbollah seems less active now, Iran has expanded its influence through relations brokered by Venezuela’s president Hugo Chávez.
Substantive ties are mainly with members of Chávez’s Bolivarian Alliance—countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. Various experts think it may be Iran’s way of countering U.S. influence in the Middle East. Engagement includes projects to build hospitals and cement plants, joint ventures in petroleum and mineral exploration (including uranium), and, in Venezuela, factories to build bicycles, cars, and tractors. However, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards are involved in some of these enterprises, and Iranian troops have been invited to train Ecuadoran and Bolivian patrols in counter-narcotics techniques. Moreover, joint financing arrangements and trade provide opportunities for Iran to acquire sanctioned materials and technology for their nuclear and military programs.
Outside of the Bolivarian Alliance, Iran has been held at arm’s length. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadenijad was denied a self-invite to Brazil a year ago and disinvited to President Otto Pérez Molina’s inauguration in Guatemala about the same time. Relations with the majority of countries in the hemisphere remain at a low level. And with Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez reportedly suffering a terminal illness, the Islamic Republic could lose its primary regional interlocutor. So is added attention and a strategy for countering potential threats really necessary?
Given Iran’s hostility toward the United States, Israel, moderate Arab states, and western democracies in general, the answer is yes. Given its desire to cloak its nuclear intentions, the answer is yes. Complacency would be irresponsible. But some ways of doing this are more effective than others. The administration should neither overstate nor understate the threat that Tehran represents to the United States and its neighbors. Countering Iranian threats should not become a single-issue engagement strategy much as counternarcotics became in the 1990s. In fact, the United States can counter many of Iran’s advances by simply collaborating more with its neighbors. And finally, if Congress really wants the State Department to dedicate time and personnel to researching the issue and formulating a strategy, it should provide some resources.
Stephen Johnson is a senior fellow and director of the CSIS Americas Program.